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Executive Summary 
 
This report describes the diversity of the French population and presents the institutions that 
accommodate diversity in France. Drawing on historical analysis and recent surveys on immigrant 
populations in France, it shows the main dimensions of cultural diversity that are perceived as 
challenging and explains why. It recalls some of the main events in recent decades when cultural 
diversity emerged as an issue and how this has been dealt with. It maps out the state of the institutional 
arrangement that is in place to accommodate cultural diversity in order to define the main axes of 
analysis for the subsequent stages of this research project. 
 
The diversity of the French population 
 
The demographic fact of diversity in France is a product of both labour and post-colonial migration in 
the post-war period. On the one hand, France established recruiting offices in Southern European 
countries (Spain and Portugal) to attract European workers and their families. On the other hand, the 
dismantling of the colonial empire between 1953 and 1962 led the French government to sign bilateral 
agreements to secure its economic interests that also favoured the circulation of former colonial 
subjects to France. Successive immigration waves created a diverse society, i.e. a society that 
encompasses populations with various origins from a geographical and cultural point of view. 
 
The diversity of French society is, however, hard to capture in figures. The official census only 
classifies the resident population under three categories: French by birth, French by naturalisation, 
Foreigners. 
In 2007, there were 61,795,000 people living in France, of whom: 
· 89.9% were French by birth, 
· 4.3 % were French by naturalisation, 
· 5.8% were Foreigners. 
The fact that official statistics only record nationality results in statistically concealing the diversity of 
the population after a few generations. 
 
This leads us to distinguish two levels of analysis of cultural diversity in France: 
- the first level of analysis is objective; it looks at the breakdown of immigrants according to their 
nationality in the national census (see Figure 1) and it includes the historical minority of the Roma 
community in France; 
- the second level of analysis is subjective; it looks at visible minorities in France, i.e. French people 
of immigrant descent who are perceived as different by the majority population and are likely to be the 
target of discriminatory practices (their numbers are not recorded in official statistics); another 
category is that of regional identities, individuals who identify themselves as belonging to a regional 
identity and who may be challenging for the State on account of their practice of a regional language. 
 
Individuals of North African descent, albeit French citizens, are targeted as different by the larger 
society, authorities, etc. which leads to their ethnicisation. This process dates back to colonial times. 
French people who are ‘black’ are also targeted as different by the rest of the society. We argue that 
physical appearances and the ethnicisation of North African origins are challenging dimensions 
of cultural diversity in France. 
 
Even though the figure of 6 million Muslims in France is often presented in the media, we would take 
this figure with caution, as it derives from the number of foreigners and French nationals of immigrant 
descent from North Africa, Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa. According to a 2006 survey, only 59% of 
French people of immigrant descent identify themselves as Muslims. Moreover, the notion of ‘Muslim 
immigrants’ is mainly in use in the English-speaking world. This is also due to the fact that, in France, 
there is a low level of religious identification as a political identity. 
  
Country diversity profile 
 
Figure 1: Largest immigrant groups in France in 2004 by country of origin (in thousands) 
 
 
 2,000 (40%): Europe (Belgium, Germany, Italy, 
 Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and 
 United Kingdom). 
 
 1,500 (31%): North Africa (Algeria, Morocco and 
 Tunisia) 
 
  570 (12%): Sub-Saharan Africa (Cameroon, Congo, 
 Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal and Mali) 
 
  222 (5%): Turkey 
 
 608 (12%): Rest of the World (including China) 
 
 
Source: National Census, INSEE (National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies) 
 
 
Figure 2: Dimensions of difference 
 
Dimensions of 
difference 
Citizenship Racial Ethnic Religious Cultural Linguistic 
Immigrants 
North Africans X  X X X  
Sub-Saharan Africans X X X  X  
Turkish X  X X X  
Asian migrants (China, 
Cambodia) 
X X X X X  
Native minorities 
Roma community   X  X X 
Regional identities* 
Occitan, Breton, 
Alsacian, Corsican 
     X 
Visible minorities* 
French citizens of 
North African descent 
  X X   
French blacks (French 
citizens of African 
descent or Caribbean 
ancestry) 
 X     
*These are subjective categories. They are identified for the purpose of the research only. They are 
not recorded as official categories in French statistics. 
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Understanding diversity in France 
 
The formation of the French State is connected to the idea of national identity in a manner that 
emphasizes the notion of the individual over the group and leaves membership of a minority group 
(whether on the basis of religion or culture) to the private sphere. This dates back to the French 
Revolution of 1789, when the idea of the nation emerged from the unification of citizens as opposed to 
the addition of groups (which characterised the Ancien Régime). It is expressed in the French notion of 
citizenship, which is civic and not ethnic, and encompasses all citizens regardless of their origin, race 
or religion. Immigrants have been able to become French citizens through an open code of nationality 
and the naturalisation process has been a pivot of their integration in France. The French strategy to 
guarantee equality among the citizens is to make difference invisible. In the process of immigrants’ 
integration, their belonging to different cultural and religious groups has been kept in the 
private sphere. 
 
Two essential features can be highlighted to clarify the understanding of cultural and religious 
diversity in France: the scope of nationality and laïcité. 
 
 The questions of citizenship and the naturalisation process have been at the core of debates on 
diversity and integration for 30 years now. In response to the debate over immigration issues, 
the French government modified the nationality code successively in 1986, 1993 and 1998. 
 1986: the Chirac government (right-wing) introduced a new bill to bring automatic 
naturalisation of second generation immigrants to a halt. 
 1993: the Pasqua laws were passed (right-wing government), including the requirement that 
second generation immigrants actively declare their desire to be French. 
 1998: the Guigou law (left-wing government) suppressed the requirement for the second 
generation to make an express declaration that they desired to be French. 
In 2007, the government created a Ministry of Immigration and National Identity, clearly 
articulating the link between the two notions. The same year, it introduced a New Reception and 
Integration Contract for newly arrived migrants to follow (it consists in language learning and 
knowledge acquisition). In 2010, however, having launched a series of debates over national 
identity and having received many criticisms, this Ministry was dissolved and the administrative 
units to oversee the regulation of immigration flows were reassigned to the Ministry of the 
Interior. 
 
 Laïcité is the French understanding of secularism and it guarantees that religious beliefs are kept 
in the private sphere. It is enshrined in the 1905 law separating Church and State, and it 
stipulates that the State will not fund any activity related to a religious community. It also rules 
out any official representation of religion in public spaces. It is an active principle to protect the 
right to belief and disbelief in the society. 
 
Accommodating religious diversity in France 
 
The reassessment of laïcité has been used to tackle the challenge of Islam since the first affair of the 
veil in 1989, when two girls in a Paris suburb (Creil) insisted on wearing an Islamic veil in class. The 
State Council then recommended a flexible understanding of the laïcité law and left it to the school 
head to decide whether or not to allow pupils to wear religious symbols in the classroom. In 2004, 
however, a law was passed laying down a more restrictive understanding of laïcité and banning the 
conspicuous display of religious signs in schools (including Islamic veil, Jewish kippah and large 
Christian cross). 
 
The fact that laïcité has been presented as the main institutional arrangement to deal with the challenge 
of religious diversity in France will have to be analysed in a critical perspective. As a matter of fact, 
  
some analysts have argued that the debate on laïcité has fostered a sharp return of assimilationism and 
forms part of an increasing rise of ‘Islamophobia’. 
 
Accommodating cultural diversity in France 
 
Following the impetus of the EU, the French government established a High Authority to fight 
discrimination and promote equality (Haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour 
l’égalité, HALDE) in 2004. Despite a change in framing (from the promotion of equality to anti-
discrimination), the High Authority remained reluctant to adopt a strategy to acknowledge differences 
among individuals. Furthermore, the racial construction of visible minorities is little acknowledged, in 
the sense that the category of race is barred from scientific discourse on differences. 
 
Axes for further analysis 
 
In the subsequent stages of the project we will attempt to analyse the state of tolerance or acceptance 
or respect in French society. 
 
 In one axis of analysis, we will take the example of laïcité to see if it is a code word for tolerance 
in the sense that the presence of religious expressions is only tolerated, or if it qualifies as an 
instrument of acceptance or even respect as a means to recognise religious affiliation. In 
particular, we will see if laïcité operates as an organisational tool that contributes to the process of 
institutionalising differences and can represent an instrument of official recognition. 
 
 Our understanding of diversity will encompass religious and cultural diversity. In a second axis of 
analysis, we will tackle the recognition of immigration as a valuable input to the French national 
narrative. Here the analysis of how immigration and cultural minorities are introduced in 
educational curricula will help clarify what place is assigned to the immigrant experience in the 
general understanding of the national culture. 
Keywords 
Immigration, national identity, tolerance, cultural diversity, equality, minority claim, cultural 
pluralism, post-colonial, Islam, laïcité 
 
 
  
 
1. Introduction 
 
France is a country of immigration and diversity is an important component of the society. 
Immigration waves from 1900 to the Second World War included flows from Northern Europe 
(Belgium), Eastern Europe (Poland) and Southern Europe (Italy and Spain). After the Second World 
War, while a significant number of immigrants came from Southern Europe (Spain and Portugal), the 
post-colonial component of immigration increased (Algeria, Morocco and other African countries).
1
 
The demographic fact of diversity in contemporary France is a product of both labour and post-
colonial migration. In the post-war period, France signed bilateral agreements with Southern European 
countries to attract European immigrants whom the French authorities regarded as more likely to adapt 
to French society than post-colonial workers.
2
 However, the dismantling of the colonial empire and the 
treaties that France signed with the newly independent countries
3
 included articles that favour the 
circulation of former colonial subjects to the Métropole.
4
 As a result, the post-colonial input represents 
an important part of French cultural diversity today. 
 
The State’s response to the diversity of the French population has been to make difference invisible, or 
more precisely to leave ethnicity and religious expressions in the private sphere. It is based on the 
French conception of citizenship, inherited from the 1789 Revolution, which is civic and not ethnic, 
and it is anchored in the Republican values that structure the national discourse on diversity. 
Moreover, since the 1905 law separating Church and State, it has been argued that by keeping official 
differences in the private sphere everyone will be considered the same and will, therefore, enjoy 
equality. Religious affiliations are kept private, and laïcité (the French version of secularism) is a 
central principle of the modern State. It maintains a strict separation between religious matters and 
public life. As a consequence, discourses on cultural and religious diversity are hard to pin down in the 
French public space and are usually understood as conflicting with Republican values. 
 
This report describes the diversity of the French population and explores the institutions that try to 
accommodate diversity in France. It also shows how the notion of cultural diversity has emerged in 
national debates and when. First, we will outline the main historical events in the formation of the 
State and national identity to understand the challenge of cultural diversity in the French context. It 
will be seen that the formation of the French State is connected to the idea of national identity in a 
manner that emphasizes the notion of the individual over the group and, formally, does not allocate 
space for the acknowledgement of diversity in the public arena. Secondly, we will explore how issues 
have emerged which were perceived as resulting from the diversity of the population and how they 
have been approached and dealt with. This will lead us to identify what kinds of identities are 
perceived as different and/or challenging in the French context. Thirdly, we will explore the concept 
of tolerance in France. We will look at the concept of laïcité and see how it has been used to 
accommodate religious diversity in France. Does it foster tolerance towards religious expression? We 
will see that laïcité has been used to deal with tensions resulting from the purportedly religious 
character of post-colonial migrants and we will discuss its reassessment in response to the concern 
                                                     
1
 The French colonial empire consisted of colonies, protectorates and mandates in Africa, the Middle East and South-East 
Asia. Migrants of former colonial countries came mainly from Algeria, Morocco, Senegal, Mali, Mauritania and 
Cambodia. 
2
 Attempts to sign agreements with Portugal in 1963, and bilateral agreements with Yugoslavia on 25 January 1965. 
3
 Independence of Cambodia (1953), Vietnam (1954), Tunisia and Morocco (1956), Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, 
Congo-Brazzaville, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Senegal, Mauritania, Niger, Togo, Central African Republic and 
Madagascar (1960), Algeria (1962). 
4
 The term Métropole refers to French territory in Europe (continental France and the adjacent islands such as Corsica) as 
opposed to French territories that are located outside Europe (‘Overseas Territories’).  
  
about Islam. In conclusion, we will draw the main axis of analysis that we believe should be pursued 
to enhance the understanding of tolerance towards cultural diversity in France. 
2. State formation and national identity 
2.1. Historical elements on the formation of the French Nation-State 
 
The formation of the French nation dates back to the French Revolution of 1789. It is based on the 
idea of a nation composed of citizens as opposed to the addition of groups that characterised the 
Ancien Régime: the nobility, the clergy and the Third Estate. As argued by Gerard Noiriel: ‘[the] 
context of anti-aristocratic and anti-clerical mobilisation explains, far beyond the philosophy of the 
Enlightenment, the essential aspects of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens. Behind the 
haunting theme of equality is found a violent rejection of all privileges (and all stigmatisations) based 
on origin’ (Noiriel 1999: 46). The French conception of citizenship is civic and implies a vertical 
relation between the citizens and the State. It does not recognise the intermediate level of a group or a 
specific community based on origin. The State should consider each individual regardless of his/her 
origin, race or religion. Even though the events took place two centuries ago, this universalist principle 
is considered as guiding the understanding of the relationship between each citizen and the State (cf. 
article 1 of the Constitution of 1958: ‘All citizens shall be equal before the law, regardless of their 
origin, race or religion’). The myth of the French Revolution that embodied the victory of the people 
over the nobility laid the emphasis on the universalist principles that linked citizens with one other, 
rather than their original membership of a group. 
 
The 19
th
 century was marked by an effort to unify French territory and French culture (mainly through 
the teaching of French as the first language for all French people) and suppress regional identities. 
Transforming ‘peasants into Frenchmen’ (Weber 1976) was the goal of the Third Republic from 1870 
to 1940. It anchored the conception of a French population as a product of a fusion of people into one 
common language and identity. Ethnic specificities – understood as regional identities – were to be 
subsumed in the larger French national identity through the practice of the French language. From this 
founding period of French society there has remained until today the conviction that additional forms 
of identity such as regional, religious or immigrants’ origin are to be kept in the private sphere. As a 
result, little room is left for the articulation of minority claims in the public sphere. 
 
However, throughout the 19
th
 and the 20
th
 centuries, the creation of the colonial empire induced a 
breach in the universalist principle of French equality. The French State allocated differential status to 
indigenous populations and European expatriates. Nowhere was this differentiation stronger than in 
Algeria, where European settlers from Italy, Spain or France were granted French nationality and 
citizenship whereas the indigenous populations were kept in a specific status with different political 
and legal rights. In the colonies, indigenous populations were nationals but not citizens. Ethnicity, 
then, worked as a ‘juridical category’ to distinguish the ‘Metropolitan’ from the ‘Indigenous’ 
(Kastoryano 1999: 67). After the Second World War, the French Empire was renamed the French 
Union and colonial subjects became citizens of the French Union. They only enjoyed a truncated 
version of citizenship, however, and they did not have any political rights in the colonies (Weil 2008). 
 
The case of differential status in the French colonies offers an example of a breach in the continuity of 
the universalist principle. It demonstrates that, in the colonial context, the Republic made distinctions 
between individuals on the basis of their belonging to a specific group considered as ethnically 
different. Furthermore, post-colonial immigrants who came to France in the second half of the 20th 
century carried this complex system of status with them. Being born in a French colony gave them 
  
special access to French nationality.
5
 The story of the various colonial statuses established during the 
French Empire is still important today to understand the post-colonial migrants’ complex relationship 
with French nationality and identity. 
2.2. France and the European Union 
France was a founder member of the European Economic Community and signed the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome. It was an active member of the Community until 1993, when it became the European Union. 
Since 2000, France has been the target of many criticisms regarding issues of diversity and pluralism. 
In the first case, when confronted with the imperative to open civic rights to European citizens, France 
was one of the slowest countries to adapt article 8 of the Maastricht Treaty (Strudel 2007). The French 
authorities argued that the link between nationality and citizenship was primordial and prevented the 
granting of civic rights to non-nationals. Furthermore, France was also slow to implement anti-
discrimination legislation even though some of its architects were French politicians (Guiraudon and 
Geddes 2004). 
 
Finally, France is proud to see itself as a country of Human Rights. The number of refugees who are 
granted political asylum each year is high and, in 2008, France was in third place after the US and 
Canada.
6
 However, it has been criticised for its actual application of Human Rights. For instance, in 
2010, the French government was admonished by the members of the European Parliament for its 
treatment of the Roma people coming in from Eastern Europe.
7
 Voices of protest are also emerging in 
French civil society that criticise policies seen as contrary to the European Declaration of Human 
Rights. The European Union serves as a constitutional recourse in cases of Human Rights violations 
related to discrimination. 
3. The main cultural diversity challenges that France has faced in the last 30 years 
3.1. The formation of a diverse population 
 
A diverse population is one that encompasses groups with various origins from a geographical and 
cultural point of view. In the case of France, its long experience in receiving and incorporating 
immigrant populations makes it a diverse country. Limited population growth and a shortage of labour 
have made it a migration destination – and not a country of departure – since 1880. For instance, when 
the United States imposed quotas to limit entries (1924), the flow of immigrants from Southern Europe 
was ‘diverted’ towards France, and by 1931 the increase in foreigners in France was greater than in the 
United States (Noiriel 2006: 21). 
 
Moreover, like most of its neighbours in Western Europe (Belgium, Germany, Great Britain), France 
experienced massive post-war immigration flows during the period of reconstruction, coming, in her 
case, from Southern Europe (mainly Spain and Portugal) and North Africa (mainly Algeria, but also 
Morocco) (see Figure 2 below). 
                                                     
5
 For instance, children born in France of Algerian immigrants born in Algeria when it was a French colony are automatically 
French when they reach 18 (Weil 2004b: 368). 
6
 Ranking of the top 10 receiving countries in UNHCR, Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries, 24 March 
2009, p. 7. 
7
 ‘Roms: La Commission et le Parlement européen rappellent la France à l’ordre’, Le Monde, 7 September 2010. 
  
 
Figure 2: Foreign-born people in France, from 1954 to 1968 (in thousands) 
Nationality 1954 1968 Increase 
Belgian 107 65 42 
Italian 508 572 64 
Polish 269 132 137 
Spanish 289 607 318 
Portuguese 20 296 276 
Algerian 212 474 262 
Moroccan 11 94 83 
Source: National Census, INSEE (National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies) 
 
In 1974, in line with other industrial countries, the French government brought economic migration to 
a halt and the authorities ceased to deliver work permits to immigrants. After this ‘closing’ of 
economic migration, family members of immigrants could still come to France under the family 
reunification regime. However, immigrants who had no family ties in France started coming illegally 
or, if coming from countries in conflict, they tried to enter under the refugee regime. Despite the 
official ‘closure of immigration doors’, the migration influx has continued over the past decades, with 
a diversification of immigrants’ origin. In addition to constant flows of immigrants from Europe, the 
arrival of immigrants from North Africa has continued to be significant and there has been a slight 
increase in immigrants coming from other African countries. 
 
Successive waves of immigrants have settled in the country and increased the diversity of the French 
population. However, official statistics only record nationality, and the progressive integration of 
immigrants into French nationality results in statistically concealing people’s origin. There are, 
therefore, few means to reflect the diversity of the French population that results from decades of 
immigration. Official statistics only identify immigrants who still hold foreign nationality. Figure 3 
shows the development of the immigrant population according to country of origin from 1962 to 1999. 
Countries of origin, however, are grouped together for clarity: Spain and Italy; Portugal; Maghreb 
(Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia); other African countries; Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam; Turkey; and 
other countries. 
Figure 3: Breakdown of immigrant population from 1962 to 1999 
 
Source: National Census, INSEE (National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies) 
  
Since 1999, the proportion of sub-Saharan immigrants in total inflows rose from 10% to 17% 
(Beauchemin, Lessault 2009). The migration of sub-Saharan Africans is, however, still vastly 
outnumbered by immigrants from Europe and North Africa. Figure 4 below shows how the numbers 
of immigrants coming from Mali and Senegal are far behind immigrants from Algeria, Morocco and 
Portugal. 
Figure 4: Breakdown of immigrant population by country of origin 1999-2005 
  
Source: National Census, INSEE (National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies) 
These are the latest figures issued by the National Institute of Economic and Statistic Studies (INSEE) 
on the immigrant population. A subsequent estimation by EUROSTAT reckoned that, in 2009, 
foreigners made up 5.8 % (i.e. some 3,675,000) of the French population and that 2% came from the 
EU27 countries and 3.8% from outside EU27.
8
 
3.2. The understanding of cultural diversity through the lens of nationality 
3.2.1. The French naturalisation process tends to conceal cultural diversity 
 
In France, the official census classifies the resident population under three categories: 
· French by birth; 
· French by naturalisation (Français par acquisition); 
· Foreigners. 
In 2007, 89.9% of the population were born with French nationality, 4.3% were naturalised French 
and 5.8% were foreigners (INSEE 2007). The Nationality Code establishes statistical categories that 
exclude ‘origin’ once French nationality is obtained. Thus, once foreigners are naturalised, they are no 
                                                     
8 Eurostat, ‘Les ressortissants étrangers dans l’UE27 en 2009’, Press release, 16 December 2009. 
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longer referred to according to their origin; they have become French by naturalisation. As for their 
children, they become French automatically when they reach the age of 18 (provided that they have 
lived in France for five years by that age). 
 
Therefore, ethnicity is invisible in French official statistics (Kastoryano 2007: 69) and the very idea of 
recording ethnicity is usually deprecated with the argument that this would go against the universalist 
principle guaranteeing the equal treatment of individuals regardless of their religion, origin or race. 
However, the census of 1999 did introduce a distinction of origin in the sense that the ‘previous’ 
nationality of immigrants who had acquired French nationality started to be recorded in the system. In 
French statistics, nationality matters: officials draw lines between French nationals, naturalised 
French, and French with foreign ancestry. Instead of ethnicity, French official statistics make 
nationality, and to a certain extent national origin, visible. 
 
The statistical device chosen by the State authorities to render the features of the French population 
reflects the framing of French discourse on immigration in the sense that it focuses on the question of 
nationality. According to the French model of integration, becoming a French national remains the 
pivot of the integration process (Guiraudon 2005: 163). France keeps an open code of nationality 
allowing for a sizable number of foreigners to become French nationals according to several criteria 
(essentially five years’ residence, legal status and knowledge of the French language). 
 
From the possibility of becoming a French national given to foreigners, the official discourse on 
immigration in France has shifted to the necessity for immigrants to become French. Adrian Favell has 
demonstrated how a ‘philosophy of integration’ spread out in French national discourse on 
immigration during the 1980s (Favell 1998). He also points to the novelty of such a framing: 
‘previously [before the mid-1980s], there was no connection of immigration with the idea of 
republican citizenship’ (Favell 1998: 46). This can be explained by the fact that, before the 1980s, 
immigrants were essentially perceived from a socio-economic point of view and their incorporation in 
society was mainly an issue from an economic perspective (they were unskilled and more likely to be 
unemployed). Moreover, their stay in France was considered temporary. 
 
Having said that, it is necessary to distinguish, on the one hand, immigrants from southern Europe, 
such as Portugal and Spain, whom the French authorities regarded as an important input for the 
population of the country at the beginning of the century and between the two wars; and, on the other 
hand, post-colonial migrants who were considered temporary workers and were not expected to 
assimilate easily, such as Algerians.
9
 In the early 1980s, when it became clear that post-colonial 
migrants would stay in France, their presence started to be perceived as problematic. The fact that their 
children automatically became French when they turned 18 became a focus of political discussion. 
Issues related to nationality and the process of nationality acquisition started to represent an important 
dimension of immigration issues. 
3.2.2. Immigration and the ‘national question’ 
 
The topic of immigration publicly emerged in connection with the ‘national question’ in the late 
1980s.
10
 Subsequent events testify to a reading of immigration issues that focuses on the process of 
nationality acquisition. In 1986, the government of Jacques Chirac (right-wing) introduced a new bill 
that would stop the automatic naturalisation of second generation immigrants when they turned 18. A 
strong mobilisation followed and the National Assembly did not proceed with the bill. In 1993, 
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however, the so-called Pasqua Laws were passed: they included the requirement that second 
generation immigrants ‘actively declare their desire to be French’ by going to their town hall and 
requesting French nationality.
11
 In 1998, the need to make a declaration was removed by the Guigou 
law under the government of Lionel Jospin (left-wing) (Weil 2008). 
 
These developments regarding nationality laws on the part of right-wing and then left-wing 
governments also demonstrate how the issue became politicised: on the one hand, the right-wing 
parties who advocate a more selective approach to nationality acquisition and on the other hand, the 
left-wing parties who stress the need to preserve open access to French nationality for the children of 
immigrants born in France. 
 
The questions of citizenship and the naturalisation process have been at the core of the debates on 
diversity and integration for 30 years now. After the necessity for second generation immigrants to 
‘declare’ their desire to be French, the French government tackled the possibility for all foreigners 
who have been living legally in France for a minimum of five years to acquire French nationality. 
With an open code of nationality, France does not grant nationality automatically to those requesting 
it: the average rate of acceptance from 2000 to 2004 was 77.4% and in 2004, for instance, 64,695 
requests were granted out of 81,680, i.e. 79% (Ministère de l’Emploi 2006: 81). The administration 
expects applicants to fulfil ‘assimilation criteria’ such as knowledge of the French language, stable 
financial resources and current residence in France, and also loyalty to and sharing of Republican 
values. 
 
A 2003 law reinforced these conditions and added the requirement of proving sufficient knowledge 
about the rights and responsibilities of French citizenship. These rules leave major discretion to 
officials, and applicants can be subject to judgement as to whether their application is ‘suitable’ or not 
(Spire 2005). 
 
Regarding the possibility of adding new requirements to demonstrate the applicant’s commitment to 
French nationality, one should note that this is in constant discussion. Following a European trend, the 
French government considered the possibility of introducing civic tests when implementing the New 
Reception and Integration Contract (Nouveau contrat d’accueil et d’intégration).12. The tests were not 
introduced but, since 2007, the integration of immigrants has been supervised by the National Office 
for Immigration and Integration (Office français de l’immigration et de l’intégration). Newly arrived 
immigrants – with a legal status – are encouraged through this ‘contract’ to learn French and acquire 
knowledge of French laws. While naturalisation is not obligatory the compulsory steps that each 
foreigner should take make it clear that it is a desirable outcome. 
 
In 2007, the newly elected President Sarkozy created a Ministry of Immigration and National Identity, 
clearly articulating the link between the issue of immigration and that of nationality. However, the 
Ministry oversaw activities pertaining to immigration regulation and social aid that had previously 
been dealt with by existing administrative units. In 2009, the Minister launched a series of debates to 
take place in all regions of the country on French national identity.
13
 The creation of such a ministry 
was much criticised
14
 and the campaign of debates attracted considerable negative coverage. After 
                                                     
11
 Although the declaration was easy to make, studies have shown that children of immigrants born in France did not always 
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three years, the Ministry of Immigration and National Identity was abolished and the regulation of 
immigration flows was re-assigned to the Ministry of the Interior in November 2010. 
 
Finally, in a speech delivered in response to violence which occurred during the summer of 2010 in 
Grenoble (south-east France), President Nicolas Sarkozy announced the possibility of stripping 
offenders of their French nationality provided that they had been naturalised in the previous ten 
years.
15
 This last attempt not only to limit access to nationality but to threaten to withdraw it shows 
how the process of nationality acquisition is again and again called into question in response to what is 
perceived as a challenge related to the diversity of the society.
16
 
3.3. The understanding of religious diversity through laïcité 
3.3.1. The enforcement of laïcité aims at organising the co-existence of various religious faiths 
 
There are no official statistics that record religious affiliation in the French population. However, it is 
fair to say that the French population is mainly Catholic. Jews, Protestants and Muslims are ‘religious 
minorities’ in France. As a matter of fact, according to D. Lochak while the official discourse rejects 
the notion of minorities, the term ‘minority’ has appeared in legal texts in reference to ‘religious 
minorities’ since the 1789 Revolution (Lochak 1989). 
 
Laïcité, defined as the separation of Church and State in all things pertaining to public life, seems to be 
the principle that provides for the co-existence of various religious faiths in French society. It is 
embodied in the 1905 law separating Church and State and rules out any official representation of 
religion in public places. It also implies that religious affiliations are not considered a legitimate basis 
for the identification of groups. 
 
In other words, there is no official recognition of religious affiliation. This is understood as a way to 
guarantee the neutrality of the State and the equal treatment of individuals on the basis of citizenship. 
3.3.2. The reassessment of laïcité to tackle the challenge of Islam 
 
In a context where the acknowledgement of various religious affiliations is little articulated in the 
public sphere, the formation of a Muslim minority is mainly tackled through the scope of laïcité. As 
such, although laïcité as a principle emerged from the Enlightenment and was designed to diminish the 
power of the Catholic Church over French society,
17
 the notion has been increasingly discussed in 
connection with Islam in the past two decades. It is given a narrow interpretation in the public debate: 
although it is a tool to deal with religious diversity in general, it is mainly used as a mean to target 
Islam. This focus on Islam when laïcité is discussed is an important feature to understand how 
religious diversity is perceived in French society. 
 
The approach to issues pertaining to Islam in terms of laïcité can be traced back to the first headscarf 
affair that took place in 1989 in Creil, an outer suburb of Paris, when the principal of a secondary 
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school took the decision to exclude three girls because he considered that their Muslim headscarves 
were religious symbols and undermined the principle of laïcité. The State Council,
18
 however, ruled 
that the wearing of the headscarf was ‘not contradictory to the values of the secular and republican 
school’ and left it to the teachers and school heads to decide whether or not pupils were using this as 
an instrument of proselytism and disturbance of school activities.
19
 The 1989 interpretation of laïcité 
by the State Council was later challenged and given a more restrictive twist with the establishment of 
the Stasi Commission in 2003 and the passing of the 2004 law forbidding the wearing of ‘ostentatious’ 
religious signs such as Muslim headscarves in schools. 
 
The restrictive interpretation of laïcité was confirmed in 2010 with the debate and the passing of a law 
banning the wearing of the full Islamic veil in public.
20
 Despite the limited number of women reported 
as wearing the full Islamic veil,
21
 the phenomenon was widely constructed as an issue by the media 
and politicians. In contrast with the headscarf affair and the sequels that first arose from the practice of 
teachers in school and then reached the political agenda, the ‘burqa affair’ was brought about by 
members of parliament (on the initiative of André Guérin, Communist deputy from the Lyon region of 
south-east France), in connection with a declaration in 2009 by President Sarkozy, who was reported 
saying that ‘the burqa was not welcome in the Republic’. That the media played an important role in 
spreading the image of a threatening Islam in the previous headscarf affairs has already been 
demonstrated (Deltombe 2005; Lorcerie 2005; Tevenian 2005). However, in the case of the ‘burqa 
affair’, the role of the media and politicians is even stronger in the sense that the number of women 
wearing the full Islamic veil is limited. 
 
Moreover, it is important to note that the wearing of the full Islamic veil is advocated mainly by 
Salafist groups. These are Islamic groups who advocate a strict observance of Islam developed in the 
past ten years and come from Saudi Arabia. Their practice of Islam has little to do with the more 
traditional forms of Islam practised by North African immigrants (Roy 2010). The presence of women 
wearing the full Islamic veil in France is thus related to the internationalisation of fundamentalist 
forms of Islam rather than with the successive waves of immigrants who came from North Africa. Yet 
the presentation of the ‘burqa ban’ in connection with immigration and the question of national 
identity point at the Muslim population in France and contribute to their construction as foreign to 
French identity. 
 
The difficulties in accommodating Muslims in France stem from this construction of Islam as foreign 
to French identity. Even though the French State has found ways to accommodate Jews and 
Protestants in the past, it is making it harder for Muslims. It has been integrating Islam in a ‘pragmatic 
handling of differences’ that consisted of ‘gradually introducing the minimal dose of 
institutionalisation needed for a concrete resolution of the practical problems created by the existence 
of “minority groups”’ (Lochak 1989). As such, the Council of Moslems of France was recognised by 
Interior Minister Charles Pasqua in 1994 and, in 2003, the French Council for the Muslim Religion 
(Conseil Français du Culte Musulman) was created. 
 
Although the principle of laïcité emerged in 1789 as a way to exclude the power of the Catholic 
Church from the French State and has been associated with a strong anti-Catholic stance in France, it 
is now increasingly discussed in connection with Islam. The reassessment of laïcité in public policies 
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and public debate is an important feature of the understanding of religious diversity in France. It also 
shows how Islam is perceived as a challenging dimension of French religious diversity. 
3.4. Challenging identities in the French context 
 
In this part, we list the different groups that contribute to the diversity of the French population in 
order to bring out the types of identities that can be considered as challenging. In the French 
republican context, there is no recognition of the existence of sub-groups and the only difference 
recorded in official statistics is that of nationality (cf. supra). Thus, with these constraints in mind, we 
will detail the various groups of immigrants according to their nationality, but we will also go beyond 
this juridical view and discuss the existence of ‘visible minorities’ in French society that are not 
recorded by the census. We will discuss Islam and skin colour as essential features of the construction 
of the Other in France. Lastly, we will detail the specific case of the Roma community in France. 
3.4.1. Immigrants 
 
Immigrants are individuals who were born abroad to non-French parents and are currently residing in 
France. Immigrants may hold French nationality that they acquired after immigrating to France (in 
2004-05, 2 million immigrants held French nationality).
22
 There were 4.9 million immigrants in 2004 
(INSEE 2006), i.e. 8.1% of the population.
23
 Of those immigrants, 1.7 million are from Europe (40%), 
1.5 million from the Maghreb (31%) and 1.4 million from the rest of the world. 570,000 are from sub-
Saharan Africa (of which 70% come from a former colonial country); 48% are Asian immigrants and 
16% are Turkish immigrants. (See Figure 1 supra.) 
 
Immigrants from the EU are the largest category but fall into a variety of nationalities. Moreover, 
considering the construction of the Other in the French context, immigrants coming from outside 
Europe are the most likely to be seen as different and as tending to challenge the perception of 
diversity in French society. The largest groups are therefore: North-African immigrants, Sub-Saharan 
Africans, Asians and immigrants from Turkey. 
3.4.1.1. North-African immigrants (1,500,000 in 2004) 
North-African immigrants are mainly composed of nationals from Morocco and Algeria and, in 
smaller numbers, nationals from Tunisia.
24
 During the colonial time, Algerians, but also Moroccans, 
were identified as the indigenous population and were recruited to work in low-skill jobs 
(construction, mines, agriculture) starting in the interwar period. The end of colonial rule, in 1956 for 
Tunisia and Morocco and in 1962 for Algeria, did not stop the influx of immigrants to France, because 
of difficult economic conditions in the newly independent countries and the fact that former colonial 
subjects enjoyed a specific status in France (especially Algerians).
25
 Despite common representations 
of immigrant populations as essentially composed of male workers, families settled, starting in the 
1960s. The end of economic migration in 1974 only intensified immigrants’ recourse to family 
reunification but did not start the process of settlement per se. Despite the restrictions on immigration 
into France, the number of Algerians and Moroccans is still growing: + 100,000 since 1999, for each 
nationality. The family members that nationals from Algeria and Moroccans may have in France allow 
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them to come to France under the family reunification regime. This can account for their growing 
number, along with the strong links that the countries still have in the economic and educational 
fields.
26
 
3.4.1.2. Sub-Saharan African immigrants (570,000 in 2004) 
Seven out of 10 immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa come from country formerly ruled by the French 
State (Mali, Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire and Cameroon).27 In the 1960s, France signed bilateral agreements 
with the newly independent countries that secured French economic interests in those countries, while, 
in exchange, it guaranteed the free circulation of their nationals (Viet 1998: 219)
28
. This favoured the 
migration of African immigrants to France, although in small numbers. In 1962, there were 22,000 
immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa against 570,000 in 2004. Today, Senegalese and Malian 
nationals account for the larger groups of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa (57,000 and 48,000 in 
2005 respectively).  
 
Sub-Saharan African immigrants have been present in small number in the past decades. Their number 
has however been increasing since the last census of 1999 (+45%) and they have attracted much media 
and political attention, with the common figure of the clandestine immigrant who embarks on a long 
and dangerous journey to reach France, often illegally. However, it is important to note that contrary 
to the common image circulated by the media, sub-Saharan African immigrants only accounted for 
30% of the illegal immigrants who applied for a regularisation procedure between 1999 and 2006; 
30% were from North Africa, 16% from Asia and 12.3% from America (Beauchemin, Lessault 2009). 
3.4.1.3. Asian immigrants (258,000 in 2004) 
The number of immigrants from Asia has been increasing since the last national census of 1999. While 
the number of immigrants from Vietnam is stable, the Chinese community is growing (from 27,826 in 
1999 to 61,000 in 2005). Immigrants coming from South East Asia and political refugees fleeing the 
conflict in Sri Lanka also account for a growing number of Asian immigrants in France (mainly 
concentrated in the Paris region). 
3.4.1.4. Immigrants from Turkey (222,000 in 2004) 
Immigrants from Turkey account for 4% of the immigrant population as a whole. Since France signed 
a bilateral agreement in 1966, there has been a constant and growing community of immigrants in 
France (see Figure 2). 
3.4.2. Visible minorities: French of North African and African descent, French of Caribbean ancestry 
 
As French nationals, descendants of immigrants and people from the overseas departments are not 
recorded in official statistics. Yet surveys on portions of this population show that they can be the 
target of discriminatory practices (Beauchemin, Hamel, Lesné, Simon 2010). We argue that they 
belong to ‘visible minorities’ and for this reason should be analysed as carrying challenging identities. 
What are their main features? Why are they perceived as different from the rest of the society? We 
argue here that skin colour and a construction of Muslims as ethnically different from French identity 
have created visible minorities in France that are perceived as challenging identities. 
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The example of a recent survey on discrimination in France is an interesting case in point to outline 
the main features that are regarded as challenging for the rest of French society.
29
 According to this 
survey, children of French persons born in the overseas departments and also sub-Saharan African 
immigrants mention skin colour well ahead of ethnic origin or nationality (73% and 88% respectively) 
(Beauchemin, Hamel, Lesné, Simon 2010: 4). This shows that when French people are black they are 
perceived as different from the rest of the society and that this might expose them to discriminatory 
practices. It confirms that being ‘black’ in France is perceived as a challenging identity (Ndiaye 2008). 
Furthermore, second generation immigrants who are not black declare that ethnicity – phrased in terms 
of origin or nationality in the survey – is the main reason why they suffer discrimination. Among these 
second generations, the majority were born of North African parents. 
 
Can we speak of a North-African minority in France, and what is the role of Islam as a distinctive 
feature for this minority? Can we speak of a Muslim minority in France? 
 
In France, North Africans are perceived as different because of a process of differentiation that dates 
back to the colonial period and the decolonisation wars (Stora 1998). Islam played an important role 
and was used more as an ethnic marker than in reference to a religious practice in constructing North 
Africans as essentially different (Weil 2008). Ethnicity and religious affiliation have been used to 
differentiate North Africans from the French population in a manner that parallels a process of racial 
construction. The category ‘race’ is seldom used in the French context. However, considering that race 
is a social construct that has a close connection to ‘racism’ as an ideology or an attitude, one may 
argue that North Africans have been ‘racialised’ because of their ethnicity and religion in France. 
Moreover, in current political and media discourses the category ‘Muslim’ operates as a ‘neo-ethnic’ 
rather than a religious category to refer to immigrants with an African or Asian background (Roy 
2010). 
 
However, we would point out that the category ‘Muslim’ belongs largely to the English-speaking 
world.
30
 Only 59% of French people with North African, African and Turkish descent identify 
themselves as Muslim (Tiberj, Brouard 2006). This stems from the fact that there is a low level of 
assertion of religious affiliation as a form of political identity in France and respondents mainly link 
Islam to a religious practice. When they do not consider themselves practising Muslims they tend not 
to identify themselves as Muslims (Tiberj, Brouard 2006). This should lead us to take the figure ‘6 
million Muslims living in France’ with caution.31 This number derives from the number of immigrants 
and their descendants who come from a country where Islam is the predominant religion (Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and to a certain extent Senegal). It does not, however, entail that 6 million 
people in France identify themselves as Muslim, or as belonging to a Muslim community. It is 
therefore difficult to speak of a Muslim minority in France and it seems more accurate, historically, to 
speak of a North African minority. 
 
Finally, regarding Blacks, African immigrants may be Muslims or Christians, and so, as a visible 
minority, they overlap with the Muslim minority. Despite attempts to identify a ‘Muslim effect’ 
among Africans in France (Adida, Laitin, Valfort 2010), skin colour might be a stronger marker than 
their religion. 
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Therefore, it is appropriate to talk about a North African minority (immigrants from North Africa and 
French people of North African descent) on the one hand, and a ‘black’ minority (immigrants from 
sub-Saharan Africa, French people of African descent and French people from the overseas 
départements) on the other hand. Furthermore, the emergence of a recent discourse on diversity in 
France has been connected to the affirmation of a black identity.
32
 
3.4.3. The Roma community 
The Roma community in France is composed of French nationals who are usually referred to as 
‘travellers’ (gens du voyage) in administrative documents so as to avoid the derogatory term ‘gypsies’ 
(gitans). It also refers to one of their specific traits, which is to be nomadic and to have no permanent 
residence – although this is changing and 85% of them are settled. While they may be referred to as 
the ‘Roma community’ of France, the ‘travellers’ encompass various minorities (Rom, Gitan and 
Manouche). They trace their roots to the nomadic people who came originally from India and speak a 
language different from French. 
 
There are no official statistics that record the number of people from the Roma community in France 
and estimations vary. A 1969 law defines a specific status for ‘travellers’, who can hold a ‘travel pass’ 
(titre de circulation). In 2002, 156,282 people held this document. However, pass holders have to be 
older than 16 and some settled families do not have passes. The number of 156,282 is therefore an 
underestimation of the Roma community in France. Estimates for the total Roma community vary 
from 250,000 to 400,000 people, that is 0.5% of the population (Robert 2006: 11). 
 
The Roma community of France is not homogenous but composed of different minorities; they are, 
however, all exposed to discrimination and suffer from socioeconomic disadvantages (Robert 2006: 
9). The expulsion of Roma people of Romania by the French government has introduced some 
confusion regarding the different Roma communities and there has been an increase in the 
stigmatisation of the community in general.
33
 
4. How are tolerance and equality understood in France? 
4.1. Notions of equality and tolerance towards diversity 
 
In France, it is usually assumed that the best way to achieve equality is to ignore cultural and religious 
differences. There should be no recognition of differences. This is linked to the belief that all matters 
pertaining to public life should be considered outside of the articulation of group identities, in a 
vertical relationship between the individual and the State. 
4.1.1. The French strategy to reach equality: making difference ‘invisible’ 
 
The Republican creed is that equality will be achieved by making difference invisible. This is 
generally done by excluding any means of recording differences among individuals in their interaction 
with public authorities (social security, local office for social housing, education, employment). By 
rendering difference invisible, the official discourse bypasses the acknowledgement of differences. 
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One may point out to an exception to this prevailing view: in 1981, the Socialist Party won the 
presidential election with a programme that advocated the ‘Right to be Different’. This discourse did 
not directly designate immigrant groups. It was used to implement various types of policy (for 
instance, giving more power to regional governments in a perspective that valued the ‘regional 
differences’ of the country). Yet it had implications for the acknowledgement of the diversity of the 
population resulting from immigration to France. At the level of political discourse, the recognition of 
the multicultural character of the society emerged, especially when the demand for equal treatment of 
second generation immigrants made itself heard (Leveau, Wihtol de Wenden 2001; Escafre-Dublet 
2010). 
 
At the level of public policies, one may observe a higher level of concern for minority issues. The 
expression of regional cultures, for instance was favoured by the Ministry of Culture (Giordan 1982). 
A report to establish the cultural needs of immigrants in school was commissioned by the Ministry of 
Education (Berque 1985). Claims for the representation of minority interests were able to be 
articulated and this resulted in the emergence of a prolific anti-racist movement with organisations 
such as SOS-racism and France plus.
34
 The experience was short-lived, however. The extreme right 
parties turned the discourse on the Right to be Different against anti-racist groups and claimed the 
‘Right to be Different, yes, but at home’, calling for the exclusion of immigrants and their return to 
their country of origin. 
 
The short-lived experience of the promotion of the Right to Difference in France had a long lasting 
effect. It was marked by the success of the extremist party, the National Front (Front national), 
whenever difference is acknowledged. Today, it remains an important dynamic to bear in mind when 
considering discourses on difference in France: the racist discourse articulated by the Front national is 
still seen as the reverse side of the recognition of cultural differences. This is, for instance, exemplified 
in the distrust towards communitarianism (communautarisme), i.e. a form of cultural separatism 
considered as the inevitable outcome of group recognition and the promotion of cultural differences. 
4.1.2. The French understanding of tolerance towards religious diversity: laïcité 
 
The notion of tolerance is linked to religious tolerance. The Edict of Nantes (1598), for instance, was 
labelled an Edict of Tolerance and it recognised freedom of religious belief for Protestants in France. 
Subsequently, the concept of laïcité has been the main notion through which to understand tolerance 
for religious diversity in France. It is not a passive acceptance of the practice of the Other, but an 
active principle that keeps all religious expressions in the private sphere (Kintzler 1998). 
 
The concept of laïcité emerged from the thinking of the Enlightenment and the need to expel the 
power of the Church from all matters pertaining to public life. Throughout the 19
th
 and the 20
th
 
centuries, advocates of the implementation of laïcité in France have also been anti-religion militants. 
They have conveyed the idea that by making religion invisible in French public life, the State could 
ensure that individuals could be treated equally. Because of the power that the Catholic Church used to 
represent in French society, they have contended that religious expressions are a threat to the good 
functioning of democracy. As such, laïcité provides for the right to belief and disbelief of all 
individuals, so that no member of a religious group can be favoured over individuals who do not 
profess any religious faith. It is also a way to protect individuals from the intolerance of religions. The 
state of tolerance in France is seen as best achieved through the invisibility of religious expressions in 
public debates and political life. This guarantees the neutrality of the State and makes the equal 
treatment of individuals, regardless of their religious affiliation, possible. 
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 The creation of anti-racist groups has been criticised as spearheaded by institutional parties (Juhem 2001). However, they 
are still a distinctive feature of this period. 
  
4.2. Laïcité and equality in practice 
 
Despite a well-articulated discourse on equality in France, instances of discrimination are reported 
(Meurs, Pailhé, Simon 2006). Moreover, strategies to implement positive actions towards specific 
groups have been deployed, although they have targeted individuals identified mainly on 
socioeconomic criteria. The analysis of policy results and attitudes towards difference demonstrates 
the downside of making difference invisible: a low level of articulation of ethnic and cultural 
difference lead to situations of double standards and ethnic ascriptions. 
4.2.1. The policies to promote equality and combat discrimination 
 
In practice, a long history of racist incidents
35
 and the recent exposure of discrimination on the labour 
market through statistical surveys have pointed to the difficulty of guaranteeing equal treatment of 
individuals in French society (Meurs, Pailhé, Simon 2006). Already in 1998, the left-wing government 
of Lionel Jospin had acknowledged the failure of the strategy of integration (Haut Conseil à 
l’Intégration 1998) and a critique had emerged (Belorgey 1999). Following the impetus of the EU, the 
French government established a High Authority to fight discrimination and promote equality (Haute 
autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité, HALDE) in 2004. Despite a change in 
framing (from integration to anti-discrimination), the High Authority remains reluctant to adopt a 
strategy to acknowledge differences among individuals (Lépinard, Simon 2008).
36
 
 
Moreover, the EU directive advocates the monitoring of discrimination practices, which is difficult 
given the lack of ethnic data in France. The debate that emerged in 2008 on the collection of ethnic 
statistics is another example of the challenge to address issues resulting from the diversity of the 
population (Simon 2008). In a country where colour blindness is the rule, the difficulty of identifying 
individuals according to their ethnic traits prevents the measurement of the scale of discrimination 
practices. The difficulty of collecting ethnic data stems from the fact that the racial construction of 
visible minorities is little acknowledged because the category of race is banned from scientific 
discourse on differences (Badinter, Lebras, eds: 2010). 
 
Finally, in the implementation of policy to enforce equality, France has designed positive actions 
targeting specific groups, but policy makers have relied exclusively on social criteria. This is the case 
for Priority Education Zones (ZEP), which were created in 1984 to bring more educational resources 
to specific areas that were identified as disadvantaged (Glasman 2000). It was in keeping with the 
official discourse on republican integration and the refusal of any specific treatment according to 
ethnic or cultural difference. The policy consisted mainly in a redistribution of resources (concretely, 
schools that fell into the ZEP category had extra budgets) and did not entail tackling difference from a 
cultural or even a religious point of view. However, sociological studies have shown that educational 
practitioners resort to powerful categorisation in terms of ethnicity, cultural traits and religious 
affiliation (Lorcerie 2003). One may therefore argue that the official silence on migration-related 
diversity has favoured the unofficial development of ethnic and cultural categorisations in educational 
practices. 
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 Despite the 1973 law condemning racist speech and acts, anti-racist movements have denounced the consistency of racist 
crimes over the past decades, regularly pointing at specific cases that did not receive the adequate penalty (for instance 
the LICRA, la Ligue contre le racisme et l’anti-semitisme, www.licra.org).  
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 In May 2011, the HALDE disappeared and the fight against discrimination is now included in the remit of the new 
Defender of Human Rights.  
  
4.2.2. Laïcité in practice 
 
In practice, laïcité means that there are no religious signs in public places. Civil servants, also, should 
not wear religious signs because the exercise of public service should be done regardless of any 
political or religious affiliation. Laïcité does not only apply to the expression of religious faith, it is a 
law that is linked to the notion of freedom of expression and therefore also applies to the expression of 
political opinion. As such, the application of laïcité in French state schools prevents teachers from 
expressing religious and political opinions in class. 
 
However, laïcité has been put into practice in a mainly Catholic country. This means that since its 
inclusion in the Ferry law of 1882 and its institutionalisation in the 1905 law, the Catholic Church has 
fought to maintain some of its positions (for the preservation of its patrimony and its network of 
parishes). Protestants, Jews and Muslims were not as numerous and as powerful. This explains why 
Catholicism is more present in French society. For instance, while religious education cannot take 
place in state schools, it has been the practice to establish chaplaincies for Catholics where pupils can 
discuss religion and have prayer groups as long as they do not proselytise or disrupt the normal 
functioning of the school. 
 
Moreover, although the application of laïcité is incumbent on all citizens in France, exceptions were 
made in the colonies. For instance, laïcité was not applied as such in Algeria. The State had a say on 
the organisation of Islam because the colonial administration wanted to keep its control over the 
administration of the Muslim religion (Achi 2004). Thus, from a historical perspective, the 
enforcement of laïcité has had slightly different applications depending on the religion (Weil 2007). 
 
The fact that the application of laïcité is currently mainly targeting Islam in France is therefore a 
manifestation of the different treatment that each religion receives and shows that the state is not 
neutral towards all religions (Laborde 2008). Some argue that it is problematic because the debate on 
laïcité has fostered a sharp return of assimilationism and has formed part of a growing ‘Islamophobia’ 
(Geisser 2003). One can observe that laïcité has been mentioned several times by government officials 
to address the question of Islam in France. This was the case with the President’s advocacy of a 
‘positive laïcité’ (laïcité positive), arguing that laïcité was not enough. Philosophers and political 
theorists, however, have answered that the concept of laïcité is in itself positive, in the sense that it is 
substantial and protects the right of belief and unbelief (Kintzler 2008). 
 
Furthermore, public opinion surveys show a change in the understanding of laïcité in the French 
population. Whereas laïcité used to be linked to leftist political orientations and mainly associated 
with people who were in opposition to the Catholic Church, in recent years, people who recognise 
laïcité as an important value for them are also people who declare anti-immigrant feelings and position 
themselves on the right of the political spectrum (Barthélemy, Michelat  2007). 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
France’s response to the formation of a diverse population has been to leave particular identities 
outside the public sphere and promote the neutrality of the State towards any kind of religious and 
ethnic affiliations. This has been seen as the best way to guarantee the equal treatment of individuals, 
in a vertical relationship between them and the State. In practice it has prevented the expression of 
religious and ethnic affiliation in many instances of public life, such as education and politics. The 
promotion of equality through invisibility has had some shortcomings, however, and the exposure of 
discrimination or the identification of racial bias against Muslim populations in France shows how 
processes of ethnic ascription and racial construction are in play. 
 
In this report we have listed the different groups that contribute to the diversity of the French 
population and put in historical perspective the various features that make the identities of these 
  
groups challenging (from a religious or ethnic point of view). We have identified the elements of 
French discourse that pertain to the question of diversity and tolerance. In particular, the notions of 
national identity and laïcité have been put forward in recent years to deal with issues that are related to 
the diversity of the French population. 
 
The analysis of the discourse and of historical developments regarding national identity and laïcité 
makes it possible to identify the main elements that structure toleration and the logic of recognition in 
France. 
 
- Toleration
37
 in France is not so much about passively accepting that others may have practices that 
the majority population disapproves of. Rather, the practice of tolerance, toleration, is an active 
principle that excludes the expression of religious and/or ethnic affiliation from the public space in 
order to guarantee its neutrality. This is, for instance, conveyed through the notion of laïcité. 
 
- The exclusion of religious practices from the public sphere should not be mistaken for the 
disapproval of religious affiliation in general. The goal is first and foremost to guarantee the equal 
treatment of all individuals in the public sphere; in the private sphere one is free to express any kind of 
religious or ethnic affiliation. However, due to the special position of the Catholic Church in the 
implementation of laïcité, one may identify a difference of treatment towards minority religions in 
France (Islam, Protestantism and Judaism). This may lead to claims of non-toleration
38
 of certain 
religious practices in specific cases. 
 
- The promotion of equality through invisibility represents a challenge in analysing the question of 
recognition in the French context. There is no such thing as the identification of groups, and the 
recognition of groups’ affiliations or the acknowledgement of their specific needs is not relevant for 
how the society operates. To develop the discussion beyond the notion of toleration therefore requires 
extending the concept of recognition to the notion of respect as equal and admission as normal.
39
 The 
challenges then lies in the acknowledgement that the diversity of the population is represented in the 
national community and is seen as normal. The value discourse on national identity, for instance, is 
deeply connected to that logic: by pointing to differences that are not compatible with the national 
identity, actors are drawing invisible boundaries. Islam does not make up the whole challenge of 
diversity in France. Cultural diversity encompasses broader challenges such as the recognition of 
immigration as a valuable input to the French national narrative. 
 
Beyond the discourse on national identity and laïcité, the subsequent stages of the research project will 
bring forward empirical material to investigate the practice of tolerance and recognition in the French 
context. 
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 ‘Toleration: Individuals, groups and practices who seek or for whom/which claims of toleration are being made and to 
whom/which toleration is granted, and the reasons given in favour of or against toleration’ (Dobbernack, Modood 2011: 
32). 
38
 ‘Non-toleration: Individuals, groups and practices who seek or for whom/which claims of toleration are being made but to 
whom/which toleration is not granted, and the reasons given in favour of or against toleration’ (Dobbernack, Modood 
2011: 31).  
39
 ‘Recognition, respect as equal and admission as normal: Individuals, groups and practices who seek or for whom/which it 
is claimed that toleration is not enough and other normative concepts, namely those that focus on majority-minority 
relations and the reform of institutions and citizenship, are or should be more relevant. They also include claims and 
processes towards the reconsideration of difference as a ‘normal’ feature of social life. Such concepts include equality, 
respect, recognition, accommodation and so on, and the reasons given in favour of or against these propositions’ 
(Dobbernack, Modood 2011: 32). 
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